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Tanzanian Economy: Crisis Management To Slow Disintegration
1983 - An Overview
The Tanzanian economy continued to decline in 1983 - by about 1.3Í in constant 
price terms.1 Since 1978 only one year (1980) has shown positive growth so 
that gross domestic product stands 5% below 1978. Adjusted for terms of trade 
deterioration the fall in national command over resources is about 155&. 
Taking population increase into account the per capita decline is of the order 
of 30%.
1983’s performance was rather better than might have been expected. On
balance weather was again unsatisfactory - especially as to the distribution
of rainfall by month. Exports - constrained by lack of transport and
2processing capacity fell 6% in foreign exchange terms though rising from Sh 
3.77 billion in 1982 to Sh 4.27 billion in 19 8 3. No breakthrough was achieved 
on a joint World Bank-bilateral donor-IMF package of structural adjustment, 
import support, consolidation finance for rehabilitation and operation of the 
existing productive capacity. As it has been evident since 1980 that such an 
initial injection of foreign exchange would be needed for recovery, this 
failure virtually guaranteed continued decline.
Shortages - for consumers and for enterprises - worsened, albeit somewhat
erratically and less rapidly than in 1981 or 1982. Inflation - as measured by
Cost of Living estimates - remained in the 25-30Í range where it has been
•2since 1980.
Economic management fell into three categories: articulated strategic plans 
for recovery and development; specific medium term sectoral policies and 
projects; day to day crisis management. The first category - quite apart from
technical unevenness - is not in fact operational given present government
revenues and overall foreign exchange (and availability). In the second some 
successes have been achieved - presumably a major factor in averting economic 
collapse on a 1979-81 Ugandan, a Zairois or a Ghanaian scale. The third 
approach, while essential in Tanzania's existing circumstances, necessarily
means fragmented decisions, short time horizons and relatively low efficiency •
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-2-
Morale has declined, hardly surprising given five consecutive years of 
economic non-success following seventeen in which the average annual growth 
rate was over 5Í. However, much nore surprisingly, there is still a 
determination to try to hold out and make the best of things. The continued 
working out of medium term programmes and long term plans (and revision when 
they are overtaken by events) is an example as is the restoration of basic 
Bank of Tanzania services within 10 days after its headquarters was gutted by 
fire on May 17, 1984.
A somewhat less satisfactory element is a continued tendency to shift policies 
and institutions too frequently and with too little forward planning and 
preparation - e.g. the sudden introduction of semi-multiple channel, 
differentiated (full cost) regional grain marketing from 1 July 1984.
The 1984-85 Budget Package: Recovery Strategy Mark IV
The 1984-85 Tanzania Budget Speeches were the occasion for setting out 
another recovery programme following on the 1980 Structural Adjustment, 1981
Economic Survival and 1982 Structural Adjustment each of which failed
\
dominantly because the minimum external finance needed for the package to work 
could not be secured and the Economic Survival programme also because 1981 
terms of trade falls wiped out its 15-20/i export volume growth achievement. 
Because the economy has deteriorated steadily raising costs of deferred 
maintenance and rehabilitation as well as of raising capacity utilisation, 
exports have fallen because of the direct and indirect effects of import 
shortages and debt service and commercial arrears have risen each successive 
programme has had to be harsher and to posit slower recovery than its 
predecessor.
The most striking features of the programme were probably the 25-9% 
devaluation from Sh 12.6 to Sh 17 to the USA $, the indication of averge 
producer price increases of 40-45Í, the reorganisation on a regional basis of 
grain marketing with elimination of the sembe subsidy, the reinstitution of 
local government income tax (termed Development Levy although in fact f°r 
District and Urban Council Recurrent services), the 35% increase in minimum 
wage with other wage and salary increases tapering down to 8% for top salary 
earners and the abolition of fertilizer and other farm input subsidies. Taken
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together with fairly standard tax boosts on petroleum products, beer and 
cigarettes these imply retail price increases of from 25 to 60$ on most 
consumer goods and up to 300$ on sembe in deficit regions far from surplus 
areas and/or ports, e.g. Mwanza.
The overall Budget for 1984-85 is 15$ above 1983-84 in nominal terms at Sh
24.7 billion versus Sh 21.5 billion. However as 50 to 60$ price increases for
goods and an average wage/salary increase of 25$ are likely this represents a 
real reduction of over 20$. In part this results from shifting some 
expenditure to local authority taxes and also from reductions in subsidies to 
consumers, producers and export marketing bodies. Even after these
adjustments the real decline would appear to be at least 10$. The capital
(development) budget at Sh 6.6 billion is up by 13$ nominal and the recurrent 
at Sh 18.1 is up by 16$. In real terms allowing for subsidy and revenue 
sourcing changes the constant price capital budget is projected at 25$ below 
1983/84 and the recurrent at perhaps 5$.
Despite tax increases - and in part because of radically (apparently over 30$) 
lower external loan and grant estimates - the bank borrowing requirement is 
expected to rise to Sh 5.2 billion up from Sh 3*1 billion budgeted for in 
1983/84. Preliminary indications are that 1983/84 Recurrent Revenue and 
Expenditure were both above initial estimates and bank borrowing near the 
projected level.
Over 1983-84 domestic bank credit grew 17.5$ (versus an original target of 
19.3$) to Sh 32.1 billion. This - in the teeth of 27$ price increases - 
represents continuation of the significantly contractionist policy which has 
pushed borrowing growth down steadily from nearly 50$ in 1979-80. The 1984-85 
programme calls for a 19*3$ increase (versus probable price increases of 50 to 
60$) or Sh 6.2 billion. The very low Sh 1.0 billion for enterprise net 
borrowing implies continued contractions in inventories and in total real 
output.
While the budget programme has been widely seen as a peace offering to the 
IMF , its projections clearly do not include any IMF, World Bank structural or 
related bilateral import support funding. Over a full year such a package 
totalling $ 300 million could be expected to cause output and tax increases 
reducing the government bank borrowing by perhaps Sh 2.5 to 3*5 billion while
raising enterprise borrowing (to cover larger inventories) by perhaps Sh 2.0 
billion. Given the 6 to 7 month lag from programme agreement to funds release 
to arrival of imports through their use in local production to sales and tax
collection a programme concluded in September 1984 might reduce the
v i, r-vv-,;
government's bank borrowing by up to Sh WITH a comparable increase in
enterprise requirements. Tanzania clearly wants bilateral payments support 
and Bank structural or sectoral funding. Indeed one may doubt that the 
programme can work without it. However, the very cautious revenue and 
recurrent budget deficit projections suggest that Tanzania does not perceive 
such agreement - which would in practice be contingent on concluding an IMF 
programme agreement - as imminent.
Toward A Structural Adjustment Package?
Any observer of IMF-Tanzania negotiations in late 1982 early 1983 who returned 
to following them in early 1984 could be forgiven for wondering whether he was 
not looking at year old stories. The IMF's call for a 60-70Í devaluation at 
one go seems constant no matter what the intervening Tanzania devaluations or 
proposals for phased return to the 1979 or 1980 real exchange rate which the 
World Bank at least did not consider to be seriously overvalued. Indeed the 
World Bank apparently believes the rate which in date 1983 would have restored 
purchasing power parity to be Sh 18.5 to the dollar and that adjustment to 
purchasing power parity (at a higher rate than 18.5 given Tanzania’s high 
inflation rate) could usefully be spread over two to three years - positions 
which are apparently very close to those held by Tanzania but distinctly 
divergent from the Fund’s.
On other conditions the Fund has apparently oscillated agreeing at one set of 
talks and reopening the issue at the next. This includes agricultural prices 
which - arguably - Tanzania is already raising too rapidly. They also include 
domestic credit formation since Tanzania’s target of phasing out the recurrent 
budget deficit over two to three years, allowing enterprises to hold larger 
inventories to raise production and projecting 50-60/6 inflation in the first 
year of a fund programme leads to its calculating the necessary increase in 
domestic bank lending at 20% which is apparently almost double the Fund’s 
target.
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Whether the 1984-85 Budget package which does include a substantial 
devaluation, a bank credit growth rate just under 20%, substantial grower 
price (and lower wage) increases, elimination of all subsidies will prove 
acceptable to the Fund is unclear. The Budget itself clearly does not count 
on a Fund - Bank - bilateral adjustment package but could be adjusted to fit 
one (with a lower government and a higher enterprise bank borrowing 
requirement if the funds begin to flow in September or earlier).
The World Bank on the other hand increasingly sees Tanzania’s successive 
survival, adjustment and efficiency programmes as having gone far enough to 
justify a substantial sectoral or structural adjustment programme. Were a 
Fund programme agreed a Bank one (including industrial as well as agricultural 
and transport sector revival inputs) could probably be agreed fairly rapidly. 
However, even though the Bank’s analysis seems closer to Tanzania’s than the 
Fund’s tradition forbids a Bank structural adjustment programme without a 
prior Fund programme.
Bilateral balance of payments support would probably be mobilizeable at a 
donor’s conference once Bank and Fund Programmes were agreed. In the absence 
of Bank and Fund agreements prospects for adequate additional funding are dim.
On Tanzanian calculations at least $ 350 million a year for three years (above 
normal aid and borrowing) is needed for rehabilitation. Of this $75-100 
million (substantially to reduce arrears) a year might come from the Fund, a 
similar amount from the Bank and $ 150-200 million from bilateral sources
(partly perhaps by substituting rehabilitation and balance of payment support 
for a portion of present project aid).
Economic Saboteurs And Loafers; Rationalisation And Reversion
The 1983 economic sabotage campaign^ led to 4,216 arrests by the end of April 
1984. Of these 2,155 were acquitted, 424 convicted, 508 referred to other
g
courts and 1,187 were pending.
The acquittal rate suggests a certain over-enthusiasm in the initial wave of 
arrests but it also demonstrates that the special National Anti Economic 
Sabotage Tribunal has not proven to be a ’’kangaroo court” as critics initially
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charged it with being. In fact it operated virtually as a wing of the High 
Court presided over by a judge with assessors and using fairly little modified 
procedures.
However, the pattern of failure to articulate procedures in advance appears to 
have been repeated in the 1984 Manpower Act.^ Its intent is to ensure that
able bodied adults work and it is in one sense an updating of the vagrancy
provisions used in previous repatriations of urban unemployed to home areas. 
Initial roundups in Dar es Salaam showed total inability to separate
unemployed within the meaning of the Act from dependent wives, informal sector 
self employed (especially petty traders and prepared food stall operators) and 
students. Of 6,000 initially "netted” in Dar es Salaam on October 18 only 
about a tenth were actually subject to relocation under the Act.
1984 efforts were reorganised in two ways. First national identification
cards were issued (as they have been on various past occasions but with
limited coverage and less continuity). Second 10 House Cell (neighbourhood)
Party leaders were involved in preparing lists of employed persons, students
and wives they represented to reduce the danger of massive mistaken arrests by 
10police.
Agriculture: Analysis, Policy and Restructuring
Following the return of Agricultural planning and policy from the Marketing 
Development Bureau to the Ministry of Agriculture (now reunited with 
livestock) there has been an upsurge of policy papers, plans, policy changes 
and institutional restructuring. One might indeed question whether there is 
not now, in some respects, too much fluidity and substitution of policies and 
insitutions rather than making existing ones work.
13What most critics of Tanzania agricultural strategy, policy and performance 
fail to take into account is the historic record. From 1961 through 1978 
Tanzania had a 3*5% trend rate of growth of agricultural production. The 
highest four year growth period was 1975-78, i.e. after villageisation. Over 
1974-84 even officially set grower prices (which are the minimum a farmer 
receives) have risen modestly relative to the cost of living and almost 
doubled relative to average wages and salaries (at least 75% vis a vis the
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minimuin wage) so that the cash and household produced and consumed income of 
the ’average’ peasant household has ri > thirds the minimum wage in
defects of Crop Authorities - and they are many - most regional co-operatives 
did a poorer job of procurement, cost control and maintenance of viability 
even if individually they were smaller so that losses in any one case (at the 
much lower 1960's and 1970’s price levels) were lower. Over 1979-1983 the 
only category of imports which rose in volume terms was agricultural inputs - 
other categories fell by from 20$ to 90$* Almost all studies of agricultural 
extension officers show that most are ineffective either because they are not 
adequately trained or because no properly tested location and peasant specific 
knowledge of techniques, crop patterns or available inputs and implements 
exists to extend so that repetitive swings from centralized to decentralized 
and specialist to generalist extension structures have minimal impact beyond 
creating transitional confusion.
Clearly such an approach would not make the present performance any more
satifactory. But it would raise doubts as to whether raising prices by brute 
force would do much good (as opposed to the 1980-83 exercise of restoring some 
rationality to relative prices), as to how restored regional co-ops could be 
assisted to do a better job than their predecessors (and whether they should 
be single channel buyers from primary village co-ops), as to whether taking 
over Crop Authority extension and regional personnel totalling almost 50,000 
and not cutting down to half as many does anything beyond doubling the
Ministry of Agriculture’s budget. It might also lead to more attention to 
improved storage (600,000 tonnes of 1976-78 surplus grain were lost to 
Tanzanian human consumption because of its inadequacy and the deterioration of 
tobacco for similar reasons probably lowers the average value of tobacco 
exports by a tenth, prompt procurement and payment by Crop Authorities and 
Co-ops (repeatedly stressed verbally since 1980 especially by the President 
and the Treasury but not enforced by Agriculture), restoration of rural 
transport (whether by village, co-op, Crop Authority or rural resident private 
sector fleet buildup and maintenance support), availability of water and wood
(whose long distance collection eats up a huge proportion of women and girls’
time), access to consumer manufactures and to agricultural inputs (the latter 
again stressed verbally but not operationally).
1 97 71 ^ to parity in 1981 ^ ^ to about as of 1984. Whatever the
14These objections apply to the 1982 Mbilinyi Report and to the subsequent
1983 Policy Paper although less so than to most outside studies. 
Intriguingly despite its stress on acting on the basis of peasant interests
and desires it bears no sign of having conducted any surveys of peasants on 
what these might be and despite the fact that over half of agricultural labour 
input is by women and there is substantial gender specialisation of tasks, the 
Mbilinyi Report never once uses the word woman, girl or female.^ Similarly
it devotes a substantial amount of space to security of tenure when there is
no evidence villagers thought their villages were in any danger of losing 
their land and very few cases of boundary disputes between villages or among 
village members.
Major policy changes over 1983-84 include:
Two successive massive - over 40Í on average - annual price increases.
Removal of input subsidies on fertilizer and insecticides. Formal recreation
of regional cooperatives (and retitling village cooperatives as primary
societies) and progress toward at least some coming into operational existence
in 1984. Centralisation of all extension personnel in the Ministry (from Crop
Authorities and Regions). Decentralising grain procurement and marketing to
regional level with uniform grower but (unsubsidised) transport adjusted
consumer prices (apparently a Treasury as much as an Agriculture initiative).
Initiating a programme for strengthening research capacity. At least in
principle welcoming large private farms (for African farmers not a change in
the districts where most of them lived) and private or mixed agricultural
companies - the problem being that it is hard to see why many individuals or
companies would find large scale farming in Tanzania economically attractive.
Allowing 18 major agricultural boards and enterprises to retain 10—15% of
export earnings to cover the cost of imported inputs needed in their
*operations. Institution of a comprehensive tree planting plan and programme 
with village, peri-urban, school and household woodlets - a forestry 
initiative building on 1979-1983 experience.
Production results over 1982-83 and 1983-84 were mixed but in general poor. 
Coffee and tobacco remained largely static at well below past peaks albeit the 
1983-84 coffee crop may be up on the 50,000 tonne level of 1981-82 and
1982-83. Cotton output recovered modestly in 1983 but is likely to be down in 
1984. In the case of sisal a near gap in replanting and of processing plant 
maintenance has prevented significant output recovery.
15
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In the case of cashew nuts a detailed study has identified a series of
17problems and proposed a set of actions to overcome them. These include 
unrealistically low price relative to other crops (dealt with in 1980 and 
1981), poor procurement and transport resulting in loss through spoilage and 
lack of grower interest, increased incidence of disease, a growing proportion 
of overage trees, poor agricultural practices by growers. While only initial 
action toward implementation has been taken the apparent 1983—8^4 output 
recovery of about 10,000 tonnes or 25Í suggests some improvement on promptness 
of procurement.
Energy And Water - Limits To Efficiency
Energy and water are two related sectors which highlight the possibility of
coherent sectoral planning and programming, the continued efficiency of some
ministries and parastatals and the limits on what serious programming and
efficient institutions can achieve in the present context. The Ministry of
Water and Energy (to which Mines has now been returned) has coherent
programmes, policies anad priorities. TANESC0 (electricity) has been cited by
18the World Bank as a model public enterprise and the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation is both the second most profitable company in Tanzania 
(after the National Bank of Commerce) and a major agent in furthering 
hydrocarbon exploration and (in the case of its Songo Songo gas field) 
development. However neither petroleum products, electricity or water 
supplies are satisfactory.
19Gasoline, gasoil and kerosine shortages - especially upcountry - became
endemic in 1983. The basic reason was lack of foreign exchange. TPDC and the
Ministry managed to arrange for almost $ 150 million of deferred payment oil
and product imports especially from Algeria, Angola and Libya which averted
complete fuel supply breakdown in 1983 but must be rolled over in 1984. The
shortages inconvenienced drivers and - more seriously - delayed or prevented 
20crop collection and processing as well as causing intermittent stoppages of 
some factories, power stations and water pumping units. In the Southern 
Highlands 75,000 tonnes of potatoes were lost because the (private sector) 
marketing firms and hauliers were unable to secure enough fuel.
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Oil exploration continued in 1983/84 with Shell and the International Energy 
Development Group moving toward initial drilling in late 1984, AGIP evaluating 
its gas well and other data from Mnazi Bay (near Mtwora), Elf negotiating for 
an exploration licence ana TPDC completing production well development at its 
Songo Songo gas field and drilling at Kimbije near Dar es Salaam with
inconclusive results. To date almost $ 400 million has been spent on
exploration and (gas) development including $ 100 million on the Songo Songo 
field.
While Italian funding was arranged for the Songo Songo collection system and 
pipeline to Kilwa, progress on putting together a financial package for its
intended customer - the Kilwa Ammonia Company to produce 500,000 tonnes of
urea and an additional 100,000 tonnes of ammonia a year - continued to be
difficult, slow work. The chief barrier to securing adequate export credits 
appeared to be the fact that lenders needed to be certain the project could 
meet debt service itself as a Tanzanian goverment guarantee would be useless 
given its foreign exchange constraints.
In October a cargo of petroleum products reached Dar purportedly from the Far
21 22 East. In November TPDC and the Ministry and The Observer independently
traced its origin to South Africa via a tanker which had sailed from Lagos to
23the Republic and on to Dar.
24TANESCO continued to earn substantial profit and to secure financing for
25Mtera hydro scheme power to meet demand (now basically stagnant but likely
to rise sharply as soon as the economy recovers) to the mid-1990’s. Progress
was also made on extending the main power grid to Mufindi and Mbeya. Its
present priority projects are the north-western extension of the grid via
Dudoma, Tabora and Shinyangu to Mwanza to allow oil and cost savings by
eliminating the larger diesel stations and rehabilitation of the overloaded
26and antiquated distribution systems , especially in Dar es Salaam where power 
cut and voltage fluctuation costs to users have been estimated at between $ 75 
and $ 90 million a year. Both of these projects are designed but to date the 
foreign exchange portion of finance has not been secured.
The water systems continue to suffer from overloading and inadequate 
maintenance - as well as fuel and electricity shortages. While 50Í of 
Tanzanians nominally have access to water systems at least 50Í of the rural
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systems are non-operational for at least a month a year and the urban systems 
are subject to recurrent breakdowns. In both cases the underlying problem is 
a long period of inadequate maintenance related partly to budgetary stringency 
but rather more to lack of foreign exchange for spares.
Industry - A Disaster Area
Manufacturing output in Tanzania has declined by over 50$ since 1978. This is 
the single greatest disincentive to peasants and workers (who cannot buy what 
they want), the source (via lost sales and company tax) of up to two thirds of 
the Recurrent Budget deficit and together with drought and import constraint 
caused food shortfalls the reason price control has become increasingly 
ineffective since 1979 after relatively good 1973-78 experience.
The problem is not that the average operating and maintenance import content 
is particularly high. At about 20$, it is quite low for Africa and average 
for a small country. Unfortunately that means that every shilling of import 
allocation cuts means a loss of four shillings local input and manufacturing 
value added, two and a half shillings of transport and commerce earnings and 
thus ten shillings of retail price available goods.
While a number of plants are under construction - e.g. sheet glass, ceramics, 
salt - the main problem is inability to operate even existing plants at above 
25$ of average capacity. Tanzania could produce virtually all of its consumer 
goods, most of its construction inputs and perhaps a fifth of its implements, 
spares and agricultural inputs if it could use existing plant at the 70$ of 
capacity rates typical through 1978.
Three products have received special attention over 1983-84: farm
26 2T 28implements, bicycles (for rural transport) and paper (for education and
export). The first programme is one of debottlenecking, the second of
rehabilitation and the third the completion of the 60,000 (later 75,000) tonne
Mufindi Pulp and Paper Mill which at $ 250 million will be Tanzania’s largest
single industrial investment.
Manufactured exports remained low despite export rebate schemes largely 
because no effective means of allocating forex specifically to export
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production or allowing retention of a portion of foreign exchange earned for 
input requirements has yet been made operational.
Transport: Rolling Up A Steep Hill
The Tanzanian transport sector is manifestly unable to cope even with present 
depressed levels of traffic. Only Air Tanzania and Tanzania Harbours have 
capacity approaching demand - road and rail bottlenecks and refusals of cargo 
are endemic. While a substantial volume of rehabilitation, construction and 
reorganisation is in progress the overhang of deferred maintenance is such 
that new breakdowns keep appearing and the overall levels of capacity and 
service improve slowly or not at all.
1983-84 has seen the start of a major rehabilitation of Tazara2  ^ involving 
substantial Swedish and German funding as well as Chinese technical assistance 
and rescheduling of the construction loan. Performance has improved but cargo 
volume remains low and remittance of payment from Zambia erratic.
Tanzania Railways Canadian designed and backed rehabilitation is also moving 
ahead - but at the pace of its local freight trains on speed restricted track. 
The full rolling stock, traction power, roadbed, rail and signalling 
requirements are beyond any likely availability of finance and forex for any 
period shorter than a decade. However, on the Kigoma line movement has 
improved enough to attract substantially more Zairean transit traffic.
Road construction in progress or about to begin includes the Southern trunk
highway financed by the UK, reconstruction of the Chalioze-Same portion of the
Dar-Arusha highway and new roads to link Rwanda and Malawi to the Tanzania
30Railways and Tazara systems respectively. In addition an EEC lorry
rehabilitaion project has put several hundred grounded lorries back on the 
roads.
Dar Port improvement plans were completed in 1983 and presented to potential
donors in Paris. While designs have been completed and tenders formulated,
31finance was still not fully available in mid-1984.
Dar Airport - a rather low priority $ 100 million project committed over
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1979-81 - will be completed in 1984.32 It apparently provides adequate
runway, parking area and terminal capacity for 50 to 75 years. Unfortunately 
failure to include a proper protective interface between the airport’s 
sensitive equipment and the fluctuating voltage TANESCO distribution system 
led to severe damage to navigation control and communication equipment during 
the first half of 1984.
33Regional Economic Cooperation
Tanzania continued to be an active member of the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference and to be responsible for its industrial programme 
area in support of which it held a successful donor-investor involvement 
conference in Harare in January 1984. It also took the lead in encouraging 
exploration toward a SADCC intraregional trade development programme hosting 
the first Trade and Finance Ministerial Meeting in Arusha in October 1983*
Discussions with the East and Southern African Preferential Trade Area 
continued. It now seems likely that Tanzania will join the PTA in the 
forseeable future, possibly in 1984-85.
Kagera Basin cooperation moved slowly because of lack of funds but two
projects - Rusoma Dam (which would serve Rwanda, Burundi and probably Kagera 
and Mwanga regions in Tanzania plus southeast Uganda) and a scaled down rail
route linking Rwanda and Tanzania’s lake port of Kemando Bay look potentially
34viable. Progress was also made on Central Corridor transport development 
including EEC funded rehabilitation of Kigoma harbour facilities.
However, the most striking development was the reopening of the Kenya-Tanzania
border in November 1983 following agreement by Presidents Nyerere, Moi and
Obote on a formula distribution of former East African Community assets and 
35liabilities. The distribution which allocated about one third of assets and 
liabilities to Tanzania was completed by mid-1984 and followed by
retrospective conversion of some external loans to the former Community and 
its corporations into grants. Tanzania payments to Uganda^ are likely to be 
largely offsets against the $100 million odd Uganda owes Tanzania and
secondarily provision of goods and services.
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Direct bus and air services between Kenya and Tanzania have been restored. 
Trade expansion (in 1982 it stood at $ 10 million Tanzania imports from and $
1 million exports to Kenya) talks have proceeded less rapidly. In practice 
Tanzania will be unable to increase its imports from Kenya significantly 
faster than Kenya ups its purchases from Tanzania. Lists of desired exports 
(40 from Tanzania and 250 from Kenya) have been exchanged.
The East African Development Bank - a surviving Community institution - 
stepped up its operations in 1983.^ Of its total lending to its three 
members of $ 13*7 million, $ 7.8 million were to Tanzania.
Prospects For 1984-85
1984 will be another bad year for the Tanzania economy. The most reasonable 
projection as of mid-year was another 2 to 3$ fall in overall and in 
agricultural output.
On the agricultural front the 1983 foreign exchange retention scheme and 
continued priority allocation of aid to operating inputs can be expected to 
have a positive impact. It is doubtful that the same can be said for the 40$
1983—84 (for 1984 harvest) price increases because in the absence of restored 
consumer manufactured goods availability they cannot be real in the sense of 
allowing peasants to purchase goods they want. The severe fuel shortages are 
likely - again - to cripple prompt buying and moving of crops. However, the 
dominant factor - especially for grain - will again be the weather. 1983-84 
rains were uneven. In the South they were reasonably good and in the Centre 
rather better than Tanzania. However on the Coast and in the North and Lake 
regions they were very poor in distribution with the North and Coast combining 
drought and flood losses because over half fell in a two week deluge in 
April-May 1984. Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions face their worst grain crops 
since 1974.
While completion of negotiations for external support toward a reconstruction 
and structural adjustment programme remains the top economic management 
priority, success cannot effect 1984 output significantly. Allowing time for 
ordering, shipping, use of imports in production and sale of products there
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are six month lags for manufacturing and transport rehabilitation and up to 
twelve for agricultural inputs and implements. Thus assuming an August 
agreement no serious production recovery or easing of shortages could be 
expected before March 1985 and - apart from improved transport - little on 
agricultural output until the 1985-86 crop cycle. Agricultural recovery in 
1985 will have to turn on better weather backed by more access to transport 
and prompter procurement (whether public or private) not external assistance.
The Ministry of Planning’s early 1984 view^ that ”1984 is likely to be much 
more promising in our endeavours to bring about economic recovery” was 
optimistic when made and by mid-year had been falsified by events. The budget 
Speech’s message^ of a rough year whose results would be avoiding collapse 
and laying the basis of future recovery was a good deal more realistic.
1985 results will turn on foreign exchange availability (realistically on an 
IMF-World Bank-bilateral additional finance package since without it 
substantial export expansion duplicating 19 81 * s 15? quantity increase is no 
longer possible) and on weather. Neither could safely be projected as of 
mid-1984.
With a financing package and good weather, recovery could be fairly rapid. 
Policy and programme packages are considerably more coherent - and more 
broadly agreed within government - than they were in 1980 or even 1983» Most 
public sector institutions are either already more efficient or in the process 
of critical examination and rehabilitation. Were import support to allow a 
25? recovery in manufacturing output (now at 50? of 1978 levels and perhaps 
25? of capacity versus 70? in 1978) the government recurrent deficit would be 
reduced by at least half. Remaining inefficiencies and incompetent personnel 
could be identified which they cannot be (except in the most extreme cases) so 
long as foreign exchange strangulation forces inefficiency on the vast 
majority of public and private enterprises, agencies and ministries.
(Written by Professor Green 
and transcribed in his absence)
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